Bose, Arup ; Pal, Debashis ; Sappington, David E. M. (2010) Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams European Economic Review, 54 (7). pp. 947-961. ISSN 0014-2921
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Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...
Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2010.01.004
Abstract
We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Source: | Copyright of this article belongs to Elsevier Science. |
| Keywords: | Moral Hazard; Teams; Asymmetric Treatment |
| ID Code: | 68659 |
| Deposited On: | 05 Nov 2011 05:03 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Nov 2011 05:03 |
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