Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions

Biswas, Shantanu ; Bagchi, Deepak ; Narahari, Y. ; Suresh, P. ; Subrahmanya, S. V. ; Lakshmi, U. ; Viswanadham, N. (2012) Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions Proceedings of 2012 IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering (CASE) . pp. 874-879. ISSN 2161-8070

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL:

Related URL:


Auction based mechanisms have become popular in industrial procurement settings. These mechanisms minimize the cost of procurement and at the same time achieve desirable properties such as truthful bidding by the suppliers. In this paper, we investigate the design of truthful procurement auctions taking into account an additional important issue namely carbon emissions. In particular, we focus on the following procurement problem: A buyer wishes to source multiple units of a homogeneous item from several competing suppliers who offer volume discount bids and who also provide emission curves that specify the cost of emissions as a function of volume of supply. We assume that emission curves are reported truthfully since that information is easily verifiable through standard sources. First we formulate the volume discount procurement auction problem with emission constraints under the assumption that the suppliers are honest (that is they report production costs truthfully). Next we describe a mechanism design formulation for green procurement with strategic suppliers. Our numerical experimentation shows that emission constraints can significantly alter sourcing decisions and affect the procurement costs dramatically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort in explicitly taking into account carbon emissions in planning procurement auctions.

Item Type:Article
Source:Copyright of this article belongs to Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers.
ID Code:98149
Deposited On:23 Apr 2014 04:34
Last Modified:23 Apr 2014 04:34

Repository Staff Only: item control page