Stability and largeness of the core

Biswas, Amit K. ; Parthasarathy, T. ; Ravindran, G. (2001) Stability and largeness of the core Games and Economic Behavior, 34 (2). pp. 227-237. ISSN 0899-8256

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Official URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S...

Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0804

Abstract

In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper, we show that the extendability condition introduced by Kikuta and Shapley (1986, "Core Stability in n-Person Games", Mimeo) is sufficient for the core to be stable as well as large, for TU games with five or fewer players. We provide a counter example when the number of players is six. We then introduce a stronger extendability condition and show that it is necessary and sufficient for the core to be large. Our proof makes use of a well-known result from the theory of convex sets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C71.

Item Type:Article
Source:Copyright of this article belongs to Elsevier Science.
Keywords:Large Core; Stable Core; Extendability
ID Code:90948
Deposited On:15 May 2012 10:00
Last Modified:15 May 2012 10:00

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