Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games

Biswas, Amit K. ; Ravindran, G. ; Parthasarathy, T. (2000) Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games International Journal of Game Theory, 29 (1). pp. 11-22. ISSN 0020-7276

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Official URL: http://www.springerlink.com/index/N4LPWPQECFV78LQE...

Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050002

Abstract

Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known. In this paper we answer affirmatively the necessity for symmetric games. We also prove its equivalence to n specified vectors being imputations and also to the convexity of the lower boundary of the set of all acceptable pay-off vectors of the game. In this paper we establish the equivalence of a condition given by Shapley to the newly evolved condition, thereby give an alternate proof to Shapley's condition.

Item Type:Article
Source:Copyright of this article belongs to Springer.
Keywords:Symmetric Game; Stable Core; Lower Boundary; Specified Vectors
ID Code:90945
Deposited On:15 May 2012 09:57
Last Modified:15 May 2012 09:57

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