Equal pay for unequal work: limiting sabotage in teams

Bose, Arup ; Pal, Debashis ; Sappington, David E. M. (2010) Equal pay for unequal work: limiting sabotage in teams Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19 (1). pp. 25-53. ISSN 1058-6407

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-...

Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2009.00244.x


We demonstrate the value of "equal pay" policies in teams, even when team members have distinct abilities and make different contributions to team performance. A commitment to compensate all team members in identical fashion eliminates the incentive that each team member otherwise has to sabotage the activities of teammates in order to induce the team owner to implement a more favorable reward structure. The reduced sabotage benefits the team owner, and can secure Pareto gains under plausible circumstances.

Item Type:Article
Source:Copyright of this article belongs to John Wiley and Sons.
ID Code:68679
Deposited On:05 Nov 2011 05:03
Last Modified:05 Nov 2011 05:03

Repository Staff Only: item control page