Gautam, Raghav Kumar ; Hemachandra, N. ; Narahari, Y. ; Prakash, Hastagiri ; Kulkarni, Devadatta ; Tew, Jeffrey D. (2009) Optimal auctions for multi-unit procurement with volume discount bids International Journal of Operational Research, 6 (1). pp. 70-91. ISSN 1745-7645
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Official URL: http://www.inderscience.com/search/index.php?mainA...
Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJOR.2009.026244
Abstract
In this paper, we design an optimal procurement mechanism for procuring multiple units of a single homogeneous item based on volume discount bids submitted by rational and intelligent suppliers. We develop an elegant auction mechanism, VD-OPT, that minimises the cost to the buyer, satisfying at the same time: Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC); interim individual rationality.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Source: | Copyright of this article belongs to Inderscience Enterprises Limited. |
| Keywords: | Multi-unit Procurement; Volume Discounts; Incentive Compatibility; Individual Rationality; Optimal Mechanisms; Optimisation; Optimal Auctions; Volume Discount Bids |
| ID Code: | 30359 |
| Deposited On: | 22 Dec 2010 09:40 |
| Last Modified: | 09 Jun 2011 08:09 |
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