Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries

Bose, Arup ; Pal, Debashis ; Sappington, David E.M. (2017) Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries International Journal of Industrial Organization, 51 . pp. 162-184. ISSN 0167-7187

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.004

Related URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.004

Abstract

We characterize the optimal access price and retail price for a vertically-integrated incumbent supplier (V) that faces limited competition from a new entrant in the retail sector. The optimal prices provide V with a relatively high wholesale profit margin and a relatively low retail profit margin. Consequently, V has no incentive to raise the costs of its retail rival.

Item Type:Article
Source:Copyright of this article belongs to Elsevier Science.
ID Code:135038
Deposited On:18 Jan 2023 07:56
Last Modified:18 Jan 2023 07:56

Repository Staff Only: item control page